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INTRODUCTION
William Hastie had a remarkable, even amazing, life. Born at the turn
of the century, into a family of unassuming background, he went from
success to success. Educated at Amherst and then Harvard Law School,
he became a lawyer of exceptional skill and talent. He won notable civil
rights eases, served in government, was an educator, and culminated his
career with close to thirty years tenure as a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. When Hastie died in 1976, his
life was a testament to achievement. His accomplishments are noteworthy
in and of themselves, but they are even more startling given the racism
that permeated America at the time. You see, William Hastie was black.
Gilbert Ware's William Hastie' chronicles a fascinating life. It also
does more than that. Ware describes how Hastie, working together with
an extraordinary group of fellow black lawyers-a virtual modem day
"Gideon's band"--championed the cause for civil rights in a day and
age when they still, in the South, had to ride to the courtroom in the
back of a bus. At the end of the biography, upon Hastie's appointment
to the Third Circuit, the reader is left with a profound respect for this
advocate of civil rights.
As Ware makes clear in this, the first full-scale biography of Hastie,
nothing about Hastie's life is without interest. 2This review, in highlighting
Hastie's accomplishments, will follow Ware's chronological narrative.
The first section concentrates on Ware's treatment of Hastie's emergence
as a leading figure in the civil rights struggle. Next, Ware's discussion
of Hastie's role in the implementation of the NAACP's strategy of civil
rights litigation is reviewed. This section focuses on Hastie's skills as a
constitutional advocate; this section uses, among the many major cases
that felt Hastie's sure touch (and Ware's sure explication), Morgan v.
*Professor of Political Science, Drexel University.
**Yale College, B.A., 1979; University of California, Davis, J.D., 1984. Member of the Arizona
and California Bars and associated with the firm of Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborn & Maledon
of Phoenix, Arizona.
1. G. WARE, WILLLAM HASTIE (1984). References made to this work will appear in textual
parenthesis.
2. For an earlier study of Hastie, which still serves as an excellent introduction, see Rusch,
William Hastie and the Vindication of Civil Rights, 21 How. L.J. 749 (1978).
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Virginia3 as an illustration of Hastie's talents. Then, as Ware does, this
review examines Hastie's administration of the Virgin Islands as its first
black governor. Finally, while Ware ends his study upon Hastie's appointment to the Third Circuit, this review briefly looks at Hastie's tenure
as appellate judge and ends by assessing Ware's contribution to historical
scholarship.
I.

Ware begins with Hastie's birth in Knoxville, Tennessee in 1904. It is
a date noteworthy because it fell a half-century after ratification of the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments 4 and a half-century before Brown
v. Board of Education.5 The year 1904, midpoint between these two
events, also was in many ways a nadir for blacks in America.
In setting the social context of the time, Ware accurately describes how
blacks, as victims of odious discrimination, were all but consigned to
second-class status as Americans. 6 The American legal system tacitly
approved this, for in Plessy v. Ferguson,7 the United States Supreme

Court had upheld the constitutionality of segregation. The Court, thereby,
sanctified Jim Crow laws under the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. 8 Ware
makes clear throughout his work that Hastie, while conscious of this
discrimination, was determined to transcend it.
Ware stresses the point that Hastie, an only child, was born into a
family that socially and economically belonged to the small black middleclass. Both his parents were college educated. His father studied pharmacy
3. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, XIV. The thirteenth amendment, ending slavery, was ratified on
December 18, 1865, and the fourteenth amendment, ensuring due process and the equal protection
of laws, was ratified on July 28, 1868.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown ended state-sponsored segregation of school children. It also
signalled the demise of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine which Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), instituted. See infra pp. 11-12 & n.8. Brown became, therefore, not only the landmark case
in the civil rights struggle but the preeminent constitutional case of our age. For an excellent study
of Brown, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). For recent studies of Brown's legacy, see, e.g.,
Educational Equality Thirty Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 515
(1894); In Honor of Brown v. Board of Education, 93 YALE L.J. 983 (1984).
6. E.g., J. WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE 224-58 (1984); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE

CAREER OF JIM CROW 67-110 (3d ed. 1974). For a sense of racism's impact on individuals, see,
e.g., J. BALDWIN, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET (1985); J. BALDWIN, Go TELL IT ON THE MOUNTAIN
(1953); R. ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945); R. WRIGHT, NATIVE

SON (1940).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. "Jim Crow laws" came to be the popular term for the segregation statutes. These segregation
statutes were first enacted in the 1890's and served as public symbols and constant reminders of the
inferior position of blacks in society. As one scholar observed:
They constituted the most elaborate and formal expression of sovereign white opinion
upon the subject. In bulk and detail as well as in effectiveness of enforcement the

Spring 1986]

"MODEST MAN-MOMENTOUS ACHIEVEMENTS"

and mathematics, first at Ohio Wesleyan and then Howard; his mother
graduated from Fiske. Moreover, both parents had fairly good jobs. His
mother was a school teacher; and his father, after being unable to find
work as a pharmacist, secured an appointment as a clerk in the United
States Pension Office, the first such appointment ever given to a black
(pp. 3-5).9

Hastie grew up in a family that refused to meekly accept the racist
status quo. Ware recounts how Hastie's parents fought the racism that
surrounded them. Ware writes, for example, that "[riather than riding
the segregated street car, they bought a horse and buggy for transportation
to town" (p. 4). This attitude is exemplified in the family creed, defiantly
expressed by Hastie's mother as: "They can't Jim Crow us!" (p. 4).
Hastie grew up in Washington, D.C., where his father had been transferred. While his parents lavished attention upon him, Ware notes that
they both continually stressed the need for him to excel. Hastie was
fortunate to be raised in a city that had a small, but active, black middleclass which supported progressive black high schools of the highest calibre. Ware rightfully emphasizes the importance of this in Hastie's development (pp. 6-7).
Hastie attended Amherst, where he shone academically. He won numerous academic prizes, was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his junior
year, and was the valedictorian of his class (p. 19). However, as Ware
explains, while scholastic acceptance was one thing, social acceptance
segregation codes were comparable with the black codes of the old regime, though
the laxity that mitigated the harshness of the black codes was replaced by a rigidity
that was more typical of the segregation code. That code lent the sanction of law
to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and schools, to housing and jobs, to
eating and drinking. Whether by law or by custom, that ostracism extended to
virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals,
orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and
cemeteries.
C. WOODWARD, supra note 6, at 7.
Professor Woodward's definitive study, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, expertly traces the origin
of the segregation statutes and their demise. His thesis that the laws resulted from economic and
political conflicts within white southern society which were resolved only at the Negroes' expense
is widely accepted. See generally L. LrIWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF
SLAVERY (1979); J.WILLIAMSON, supra note 6.

For an apt comparison of racial segregation laws between the American South and South Africa
that is revealing in the origins and purposes of such statutes, see G. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).
9. The Pension Building, where Hastie's father worked as the first black clerk, was built in the
1880's and is located only a few blocks from the capitol. It has been called "one of the great
American buildings of the 19th century" where "the American spirit is truly captured . .. [in a]
splendid and utterly American mix of romanticism and pragmatism." Goldberger, Architecture View,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, § 2 (Arts and Leisure), at 32, col. 2. It is tempting to speculate that
Hastie's father, working in this grand building with its eclectic style and celebration of spirit, became
imbued in some small way with its sense of the possible and he imparted this sense to Hastie himself.
Ideally, such a transference of spirit should be one purpose of public architecture. See id.
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was something else. Blacks were not made to feel an integral part of
campus life. They were ignored as being beyond the social pale. The
classroom might be opened for Hastie, but the fraternities and drinking
clubs were not (pp. 14-18).
In 1927, after two years spent teaching at a black high school to earn
money, Hastie entered Harvard Law School. This decision took courage,
for the legal profession was not an easy one for a black to enter. As Ware
makes clear, obstacles included the all pervasive racism, financial difficulties in acquiring the education necessary, and simply not enough
professional opportunities (p. 29). When Hastie enrolled at Harvard, of
160,0000 practicing attorneys in the United States, only 1230 were black
(p.29).'
At Harvard, Hastie excelled. He had, as a fellow student commented,
"a mind that can see around corners" (p. 30). Upon graduation, Hastie
ranked fourteenth out of a class of nearly seven hundred, served as a
member of law review, and was by all accounts a brilliant student (pp.
29-34). "
Upon graduation, Hastie returned to Washington, D.C., where he became a lawyer in Roosevelt's New Deal Administration. Ware never fully
explains what drew Hastie back. The reasons, however, are not hard to
find. Washington was Hastie's home. Moreover, these were the heady
days of the New Deal, where government work attracted young ambitious
lawyers.' 2 Another factor had to be the nascent civil rights movement.
Unfortunately, too, job possibilities were not expansive for a black attorney, even a Harvard graduate.' 3 Probably all these factors attracted
Hastie to Washington and propelled him into a position at the Department
of the Interior under Secretary Harold Ickes (p. 81). "
10. Even at Harvard itself, which had admitted black students since 1869, blacks were by no
means made welcome at the law school. Hastie would be one of only nine blacks that graduated
from Harvard between 1920 and 1930 (p. 30).
11. Hastie also attracted the attention of Felix Frankfurter, and entered into the charmed circle
of Frankfurter's favorites (p. 31). Indeed, Frankfurter, who taught Hastie constitutional law, commented that he was "not only the best colored man we have ever had but he is as good as all but
three or four outstanding white men that have been here during the last twenty years" (p. 28). This
was high praise indeed from Frankfurter, but it was also praise tainted by the fact that he felt the
need to distinguish Hastie as "colored."
12. See, e.g., P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); Rauh, Lawyers and the Legislation of
the Early New Deal (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1983). On the legal legacy of the New
Deal, see generally The New Deal and Its Legacy, 68 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1983); New Deal
Symposium, 59 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1984); The Legacy of the New Deal: Problemsand Possibilities
in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983).
13. For example, it was not until 1949 that a major New York law firm hired a black attorney.
Firm Resume of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison I (Sept. 1, 1985).
14. At Interior, he was the principal drafter of the Organic Act of 1936, ch. 699, §§ 1-41, 49
Stat. 1807, 1807-17 (codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1405-06m [1982]). This legislation ended the colonial
sleep of the Virgin Islands by ensuring it the rights, benefits, and responsibilities of a full-fledged
territory (pp. 83-84). Hastie, for his work, was appointed a federal judge for the District of the
Virgin Islands (p. 85). He resigned, however, from the federal bench in 1939 to return to Howard
Law School as its dean (p. 93).
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Hastie, once in Washington, quickly became involved in securing civil
rights for blacks. Ware charts Hastie's involvement at length. Ware describes, for example, Hastie's relationship with the radical New Negro
Alliance (pp. 66-80),1" and his joining of Howard Law School's faculty,
where he assisted Charles Hamilton Houston in developing a cadre of
black lawyers to wage the civil rights struggle in the courts. 16
At this point, Ware relates the beginning of Hastie's participation in
the NAACP. According to Ware, Hastie was instrumental in forming and
implementing the NAACP's desegregation strategy, 7 and he took active
roles in litigation that resulted in the termination of racially discriminatory
salaries to public school teachers 18 and in the first of a series of cases
which eventually resulted in Brown (pp. 35-54).19
Ware then recounts how, because of Hastie's work at the Interior,2"
Hastie was appointed in 1937 to the federal district court of the Virgin
Islands. After only two years, though, he resigned to assume the deanship
15. Hastie played a key role in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 1
(1938). There, the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act protected from enjoinment picketeers
who were protesting an employer's discriminatory practices. The Act, the Court stated, was not
confined to controversies between employers and employees or labor unions. Rather, it covered all
those who were protesting unfairness and inequality in the terms or conditions of employment (pp.
66-80).
16. For a recent biography of Houston emphasizing his contributions to the civil rights movement
as special counsel to the NAACP, see G. MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983). See also Steiz, Surveying the Groundwork (Book
Review), 83 MICH. L. REV. 1046 (1985). For an assessment of Houston's contribution to black
legal education as vice dean of Howard Law School, see Spottswood, No Tea for the Feeble: Two
Perspectives On CharlesHamilton Houston, 20 How. L.J. 1 (1977).
Houston and Hastie were life-long friends. Their parents knew one another, the families were
close and they grew up together. Indeed, Hastie seemingly followed in Houston's footsteps: Amherst
and then Harvard, Howard, and the NAACP. Hastie described him as "my friend, my distant kinsman,
my mentor and senior colleague in both the practice and the teaching of law" (p. 142).
17. See infra pp. 11-14 and accompanying notes.
18. Mills v. Board of Education, 30 F. Supp. 245 (D. Md. 1939). In Mills, Hastie argued that
the differential in pay between white and black teachers in Maryland had no reasonable basis but
for discrimination. The court agreed in a path-breaking decision. Mills became a cornerstone of the
NAACP's attack on segregated education. See, e.g., Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir.
1945); Alston v. School Board of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940); Freeman v. School Board
of Chesterfield County, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948).
19. Hastie was lead counsel in the first case in this strategy, Hocutt v. Wilson, Superior Court,
Durham County, N.C. (Mar. 28, 1933) (unpublished), which concerned a black applicant to the
graduate pharmacy program at the University of North Carolina, the only such program in the state
(pp. 46-53). At trial Hastie was impressive. He argued forcefully that, in the absence of a comparable
black program, Hocutt must be admitted. Yet Ware, in his attempt to showcase Hastie, ails to
recognize that even this exemplary lawyer made mistakes.
In Hocutt, for example, Hastie asked for a writ of mandamus; this would force the court to compel
the school officials to admit the black applicant. The court, however, was wary of overstepping its
authority and ruled that Hastie asked for the wrong relief. This was a tactical error, for Hastie should
have sought declaratory judgment, whereby rights would be specified and an important legal point
possibly won. Hastie realized his error. As he stated, "I am kicking myself all over the place for
not having thought of that possibility long ago" (p. 51). Granted, the southern court might still have
denied the applicant's claim. And the court's decision did rest on other grounds, but Ware glosses
over this key point. If Ware's study suffers any flaw, it is his tendency to hero worship.
20. See supra note 14.
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at Howard Law School. Hastie just arrived at Howard, however, when
government service again beckoned him. This time, it was the War Department.
Ware's account of Hastie's tenure as an aide to Secretary of War Henry
Stimson is valuable both to understanding Hastie and for an awareness
of the pervasive racism in the military. Under Stimson, Hastie's responsibility was to ease racial tension in the armed forces, which were still
.segregated (pp. 95-109).2 1
Ware makes clear that while Hastie strove to have blacks afforded an
equal responsibility in defending the nation, it was an uphill battle (pp.
117-32).22 Indeed, as Ware quotes Hastie, the fact that blacks had to fight
for the right to militarily defend their nation was "one of the greatest
ironies of the Second World War" (p. 95). Finally, faced with the Army
Air Force's refusal to train blacks as pilots, Hastie resigned his War
Department position in 1943 as a public challenge (pp. 130-31).
Upon his resignation, Hastie returned to the deanship at Howard. From
there, Ware follows his involvement with the NAACP and his use of
Howard as an institutional post from which to recruit and train a faculty
composed of brilliant motivated black lawyers dedicated to the civil rights
struggle (pp. 148-59).3
Because Hastie's life was intertwined with the NAACP and its goals,
Ware correctly spends a good deal of time on the organization and its
formulation of a litigation strategy against segregation. Excelling in appellate argument, Hastie helped to argue and win two crucial cases for
the NAACP before the Supreme Court: Smith v. Allwright,24 which opened
up previously all-white political primaries to black participation, and
Morgan v. Virginia,25 which invalidated a Virginia law that required segregation on interstate transportation. These cases were key precendential
stepping stones in the NAACP litigation strategy and compromise a noteworthy legacy honoring Hastie's efforts in the civil rights struggle.26
II.
Ware recognizes that a reader can best appreciate Hastie's achievements
by understanding the special demands that civil rights litigation made on
21. Segregation in the military did not end until 1948 as a result of Truman's presidential order.
22. The virulent racism in the military, and the desire of blacks to fight for their nation in the
Second World War, is accurately portrayed in C. FULLER, A Soldier's Play (1982).
23. During this period, Howard served as a center for black intellectual life. Howard, as one of.
the few "homes" open to black intellectuals, deserves greater recognition as an institution.
24. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
25. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
26. These cases are still studied in constitutional law courses and are discussed in constitutional
law treatises. E.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 388, 788 & 1164 (1978).

Spring 1986]

"MODEST MAN-MOMENTOUS ACHIEVEMENTS"

a lawyer. This pressure was especially intense on the appellate level,
where Hastie won his most notable victories. For this reason, Ware rightfully devotes a good part of his study to Hastie's appellate achievements.
A review, unfortunately, cannot be so expansive. An appreciation of
Hastie's accomplishments can be gained, however, by focusing on one
case as illustrative. The case is Morgan v. Virginia.27
NAACP litigation, such that occurred in Morgan, took place against
a legal backdrop dominated by Plessy.2" Plessy, handed down in 1896,
held that, while the fourteenth amendment had tentatively put blacks on
the same legal footing as whites, "in the nature of things, [the amendment]
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a comingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." 2 9 This
decision, by which the court labeled as fallacious the argument that
enforced separation branded "the colored race" with a "badge of inferiority," did not constitute one of the finer moments in American jurisprudence."
The NAACP chose to attack Plessy indirectly. This strategy involved
legal erosion rather than frontal assault (pp. 44-47)." Such a strategy
made sense given the context of the times: pervasive racism, an entrenched, unsympathetic judiciary, and the possibility of outright judicial
affirmance of the "separate but equal" doctrine.
Ware describes how the NAACP, without challenging the constitutionality of segregation itself, began to move against "the state's practice
of failing to make the facilities for blacks actually equal to those provided
for whites" (p. 44). Ware explains that the NAACP reasoned (rightfully)
that Southern states would not, and indeed financially could not, erect
wholly separate institutions for blacks. This was especially true in education. The upshot of the NAACP bringing suits to enforce the "separate
27. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. Id. at 544.
30. Id. at 551.
31. The strategy of erosion was designed to undercut the foundations of a legal doctrine by
chiseling out so many exceptions that it weakens the precedent and will cause it to be overturned
in the end. See generally R. KLUGER, supra note 5, at 132-33. In the context of school desegregation,
an erosional tactic, for example, was integrating state law schools even while grade schools remain
segregated. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (overturning state ban on admission
of blacks to state law school where state's alternative law school inferior); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam) (requiring admission of qualified blacks to state's only
law school where admission denied because of race).
Frontal attacks, in contrast, directly challenge a prevailing legal doctrine. A good example of this
tactic is the Reagan Administration's recent challenge to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in its
amicus brief in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169 (1986), and Diamond v. Chambers, 84-1379 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1985).
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but equal" doctrine was "to make segregation a luxury that . ..states

could not afford" (p. 44). If the states lost and appealed the cases, the
results would likely be decisions granting greater benefits to blacks (p.
44). Such a strategy would not immediately topple Jim Crow, but would
undercut it (p. 45).
Ware stresses that this strategy required skilled lawyers for it to be
successful. And Ware is correct that the NAACP could have found no
better lawyer than Hastie. To Ware, "[Hastie's] courtly reserve was emblematic of an ability to approach problems from a perspective divorced
from the emotion of a lifetime-emotion deeply felt, but kept completely

under control .. .calm and dispassionate presentation of ideas was un-

deviatingly his manner, and clarity of expression his trademark" (p. 190).
It appears that Hastie, as an advocate, had the ability to make the law
reflect black aspirations in a way that was both legally and morally
persuasive to judges (p. 190).32

Moreover, as Ware notes, Hastie was a perfectionist. Ware recounts
how those who worked with him found it both grueling and exhilarating.
For example, Ware quotes Justice Thurgood Marshall on what it was like
working on a section of a brief with Hastie:
"I worked on it and worked on it, and got it into good shape, I
thought. Then I cut it down to twenty pages, and eventually I thought
I did a beautiful job: I cut it down to six or eight pages." Hastie said
it had to be cut down even more. "And we argued, and I in very
polite fashion said, 'Well, goddamn it, if it's going to be shortened,
you shorten it!' And he said 'Will do.' And over the weekend he cut
those six or eight pages to a paragraph. And then he said, 'Now find
something I haven't covered"' (pp. 180-81).
Of course, everything was.
The sense one gets from Ware is that Hastie brought to the courtroom
a pilot's sixth sense of navigation. Indeed, Hastie's ability cooly to steer
his arguments in the midst of treacherous constitutional currents and
among dangerous precedents, thereby getting to the desired point of
landing, is exemplified in Morgan.
The case had its origins in Irene Morgan's decision to take a bus ride
on July 28, 1944. Morgan, who was black, bought a Greyhound bus
ticket at a rural grocery store in Virginia and boarded the bus already
32. Hastie understood "[tihat although the judge, as a sensitive human being engaged in resolving
human controversy, will not be enslaved by concept, the exigencies of the maintenance of an ordered
society and the special discipline of the judge's mind preclude a disposition of the particular case
L.R.)
which cannot be fitted into a general scheme." Hastie, Book Review, 32 NW.U.L.R. (I11.
1009 (1938). But when presented with a case that falls within a scheme, "a judge usually can and
will achieve a decent solution of the case before him." Id. Hastie therefore saw his duty as making
the particular issue fit into a legal framework a court felt comfortable with applying.
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crowded with both black and white passengers. The bus, as all buses
were in Virginia, was segregated; this bus, however, ran interstate. When
she boarded the crowded bus, she could not find a seat in the black
section. After standing awhile, Morgan took a seat left vacant by a departing white. The driver insisted that she move and, upon her refusal,
got a sheriff, who arrested her. She was found guilty and fined for resisting
arrest and violating a state law requiring segregation on interstate bus
lines. She paid the fine for the first charge, but appealed the second,
contending that the state law did not apply to her as an interstate passenger.
Morgan therefore concerned the segregation of passengers on buses
traveling interstate. While the issue of segregation on interstate bus lines
had never been before the Court, it appeared ripe for review. The requirements of segregated travel presented a patchwork of different state
regulations. Ten states required segregation on all inter and intra-state
commercial transportation; one required it only on intra-state commercial
transportation; and nineteen forbade segregation on any commercial transportation.33 These various laws, Hastie argued, constituted a burden on
interstate travel.
Precedent, however, was against Hastie. The Supreme Court had never
invalidated a state law that required segregation in transportation and had
never validated one that prohibited segregation. Moreover, Congress had
repeatedly failed to act; bills designed to forbid segregation always died
in committee (p. 187). There was no reason to think that the Court would
strike the statute down.
Moreover, even though Hastie built his argument on the commerce
clause, there loomed the question of the fourteenth amendment and the
Plessy holding. During the argument, Justice Rutledge attempted to apply
the amendment, and Plessy's interpretation of it, to Morgan. Hastie knew
that the time was not ripe for a reversal of Plessy. Not wanting to take
a chance on losing Morgan by digressing into the fourteenth amendment,
Hastie parried the question even though he "was bursting with arguments
against Plessy's separate but equal doctrine which he thought irrefutable"
(p. 189).
33. Ware vividly describes the obstacles such a law placed on a black's journey from Pennsylvania
to Mississippi.
In Pennsylvania passengers were not segregated, and when they reached the
Maryland line the law permitted interstate, but not intra-state, travelers to remain
unsegregated. In the District of Columbia all passengers were free to sit where
they pleased, but all were required to return to segregated seating in Virginia.
Once in Kentucky, interstate passengers were unsegregated, intra-state passengers
segregated. In Tennessee interstate travelers were segregated. No one knew what
the seating would be in Arkansas. Unaffected by local law in Louisiana, interstate
passengers were affected by local law in Mississippi. The logistics of travel were
onerous to passengers, the details of compliance were burdensome to carriers,
and all this adversely affected interstate commerce (pp. 187-88).
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Hastie's self-control must have been great to resist attacking a situation
that he considered a moral outrage. He managed, however, to suppress
his desire to urge Plessy's overturning then and there. Instead, Hastie
kept the Court's attention focused on the commerce clause, and how
segregation unconstitutionally burdened it. Hastie clung to the ground he
thought would provide him with a victory and from which the next attack
on segregation could be launched.
His tactic was justified when the Court ruled on June 3, 1946 that
segregation of interstate passengers was an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 34 With this decision the NAACP achieved a noteworthy victory, capable of supporting arguments made for analogous networks of
transportation. Of such gains, fought and won in the courtroom by Hastie,
and lawyers like him, the civil rights movement gained the momentum
that culminated in the eventual overruling of Plessy by Brown and its
progeny." 5
III.
In 1946, President Truman asked Hastie, who had been an ardent
Democrat since the New Deal, to assume the Governorship of the Virgin
Islands. Hastie's ties to the territory, stemming from his work at Interior
and his tenure as a district judge, made him a natural pick for the post.
Hastie quickly accepted (pp. 192-93).
Ware's work is strongest through Hastie's involvement in the NAACP.
It falters and lags once Hastie left the organization. Perhaps Ware loses
the tight focus legal analysis provided. Perhaps, too, Ware's sympathies
toward Hastie prevent a totally objective assessment.
This can be seen in Ware's treatment of Hastie when Truman picked
him to be Governor of the Virgin Islands. Given Hastie's ties to the
territory, stemming from his work at Interior and his tenure as district
judge, the choice appeared to augur well (pp. 192-93). It was, however,
not to be.
For example, Ware's hero-worship sees him avoid criticizing Hastie's
record as Governor of the Virgin Islands. By all accounts, Hastie's governorship was troubled (pp. 192-212). Hastie's progressive social agenda
(which Ware glosses over) clashed with the vested interests of the Islands'
elites who dominated the legislature. Futhermore, Hastie's difficulty with
34. Morgan, 328 U.S. at 386. See generally C. BARNES, A JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE
DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (history of the struggle to end segregated transport
in the South).
35. E.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (prisons); Johnson v. Virginia,
373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtrooms); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n. v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (buses); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(beaches). See generally L.TRIBE, supra note 26, at § 16-15.
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the legislature was exacerbated by his lack of political rough-and-tumble
experience, and his aloof, patrician attitude. Not surprisingly, a political
stalemate soon developed. While Hastie as governor, by avoiding either
political "strong-arm tactics" or overt "horse-trading," might have displayed "the proper use of political power," the question can be asked
whether it was effective political power (p. 224). One is tempted to answer
"no."
One also wonders why Hastie in 1946, immediately after Morgan,
chose to take himself away from the thick of the civil rights fight. The
Virgin Islands might have appeared idyllic, and Hastie had ties there
dating from his work on the Organic Act of 1936 and his tenure on the
federal bench. Still, after such notable victories as Allwright and Morgan,
why leave when other battles awaited. Ware points out this incongruity,
but fails to explain it.
IV.
In 1948, Truman nominated Hastie to United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Confirmed in 1950, Hastie became the first black
to sit on the Federal Court of Appeals (p. 225). At this point, Ware chose
to end his study. Such a choice is odd, and disappointing, for Ware thereby
leaves unexamined how the donning of judicial robes would affect so
active a participant in the civil rights movement as Hastie.
Ware's study would have profited from a comparison of Hastie as
advocate with Hastie as judge. For example, Hastie, once on the bench,
advocated judicial restraint; he both preached36 and practiced it. 37 This
approach might be considered surprising given his avowed civil rights
activism, but Hastie, with his respect for federalism and political processes, eschewed judicial overreaching. 38 Perhaps, too, Hastie was mindful of how judicial activism could become a double-edged sword.
Hastie's strong belief in judicial restraint can be seen best in Lynch v.
Torquato.39 The case, which was one of the few opinions that Hastie
36. W. HASTIE, Judicial Method in Due Process Inquiry in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW (A.
Sutherland, ed. 1956) at 330-42 (noting the "observable trend away from the idea that justice consists
of providing a workable maximum of individual freedom, and toward a more inclusive concept of
reconciling and satisfying a great diversity of deserving but often conflicting human claims.");
Hastie, JudicialRole and JudicialImage, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1973).
37. See, e.g., Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965); See also, Remarks of Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, Memorial Service, 535 F.2d 8 (1976) ("[Hastie] did not believe that he or any
other judge should be or could be so sure of his own perception of the popular will that judges
should rely on their own perception of that area rather than performing their duties with fidelity to
accepted legal principles.").
38. Perhaps this was because, at heart, Hastie was a Madisonian constitutionalist, convinced that
govemment should control itself. See Rusch, supra note 2, at 807-08.
39. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965). The analysis of Lynch which follows is drawn from Rusch,
supra note 2, at 809-10. 1 am indebted to his article for making this point.
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wrote which dealt with equal protection, was a singularly apt one. 4 In
Lynch, disaffected Democrats in Cambria County, Pennsylvania, challenged the method of selecting county chairmen. Chairmen were elected
by precincts, and the plaintiffs alleged that the wide contrast in number
of registered voters between the precincts deprived them of equal protection. 41
In arguing their case, plaintiffs strove to have the Democratic Party
workings fall under state action, thereby rendering its internal management subject to the fourteenth amendment. This was the same tactic Hastie
had pursued successfully in Allwright4 z (pp. 177-85), where the Supreme
Court held that a state election primary constituted state action and was
subject to the fourteenth amendment. Any racial discrimination involved
in it, therefore, violated the equal protection clause.
Interestingly Hastie made no reference to Allwright in his opinion when
he wrote that a political party's internal management lay outside of state
concern. As Hastie wrote in Lynch:
[A] citizen's constitutional right to equality as an elector, as declared
in the relevant Supreme Court decisions, applies to the choice of
those who shall be his elected representatives in the conduct of
government, not in the internal management of a political party. It
is true that this right extends to state regulated and party conducted
primaries. However, this is because the function of primaries is to
select nominees for governmental office even though, not because,
they are party enterprises. The people, when engaged in primary and
general elections for the selection of their representatives in their
government, may rationally be viewed as the "state" in action, with
the consequence that the organization and regulation of these enterprises must be such as accord each elector equal protection of the
laws. In contrast, the normal role of party leaders in conducting
internal affairs of their party, other than primary or general elections,
does not make their party offices governmental offices or the filling
of these offices state action which must satisfy the requirements of
Gray v. Sanders.43
Such an absence is telling.
Perhaps Lynch is indicative of Hastie's reluctance to involve the judiciary in what he perceived as purely the political sphere. After all, for
40. Hastie wrote surprisingly few civil rights cases. This may be attributed to the Circuit caseload
and to the randomness of assignments. Still, it is startling that of close to 500 signed opinions, only
two dozen deal with the fourteenth amendment.
41. One county, for example, had 750 registered Democrats and another only 18. 343 F.2d at
371.
42. 321 U.S. 649.
43. Lynch, 343 F.2d at 372 (footnote omitted).
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Hastie, government in the end must be responsible for governing itself.
Still, Lynch does stand in contrast with Allwright and it is surprising that
Hastie could make such short shrift of the state action argument. After
all, the county chairmen controlled extensive patronage.' Moreover, where
one party held political sway in a district or state, then internal party
management became, for all intents and purposes, government. This was
especially true in the South. Certainly Hastie was aware of this. Perhaps
he considered both the factual context and the times in deciding the case.
Whatever, Lynch offers insight into Hastie's views of what the judiciary
should or could do. This is an area that Ware could have profitably
explored." 5
Ware's decision to stop his work on Hastie's life at 1950 is regrettable
also from the human interest angle. If it is true, as Hastie once remarked,
that "[jiudges stand somewhat apart from the battles that inevitably rage
in society,"' 6 then how did he, one of the key participants in the civil
rights movement, cope with his removal from the struggle? How did he
also cope with the disappointment and frustration of being passed over
for the Supreme Court because it was too politically dangerous?"7 And
how does one reconcile, for example, the ardent civil rights fighter who
fought the status quo with the respected judge who, when accused by a
black militant of kowtowing to the establishment, responded: "Young
man, stop, stop right there. I want you to understand something. I am
not a spokesman for the establishment.4 I am not an apologist for the
establishment. I am the establishment."
44. Id. 343 F.2d at 372.
45. For example, Ware could have examined Hastie's philosophy toward affirmative action. See,
e.g., Hastie, Affirmative Action in Vindicating Civil Rights 4 U. ILL. L.F. 502 (1975). Regarding
affirmative action, Hastie apparently accepted the use of race as a prime consideration in correcting
past discrimination in employment opportunities and housing. See Contractors Ass'n. v. Secretary
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (member of panel that upheld
affirmative action quotas for minorities for building contractors receiving federal funding); Hastie,
supra, at 505-10.
Hastie felt differently, however, when it came to education. In that context Hastie viewed race as
just one factor to be weighted and balanced in making education policy. Id. at 515-16. As for quotas
in higher education, Hastie thought that "the use of race as a determinant of the eligibility or
qualification of an applicant for college or graduate admission offends the equal protection clause."
Id. at 516. Race could be considered as one factor in granting admission, just as geographic diversity,
athletic ability, musical talent, or alumni affiliation were considered, but it could only be considered
after all applicants had all satisfied the "formal prerequisites for admissions" and had been considered
qualified in the "professional judgment of admission officers." Id. at 515. A lowering of standards
for one race meant a rising of standards for others and hence, a denial of equal opportunity. Id.
Such a position was to be expected from someone like Hastie who excelled at Amherst and Harvard,
taught high school, and was a rigorous dean at Howard Law School. For an overview of Hastie's
judicial philosophy, see generally Rusch, supra note 2, at 807-13.
46. Remarks of Bernard G. Segal, Memorial Service, 535 F.2d 12 (1976).
47. See infra note 50.
48. Remarks of Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, Memorial Service, 535 F.2d 17 (1976).
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This last question might be the easiest to answer for while it might
seem odd that Hastie would want to consider himself a member of the
power structure that had put so many obstacles in his path, in some
respects, it is perfectly understandable given Hastie's background and
training. Hastie was always taught to work within the system, to excel
by playing by the rules, and to right wrongs using the legal means and
tools available. Hastie was not a revolutionary. He thought the system
could be changed from within, and his achievements were evidence of
it.
Though Ware's work ends upon Hastie's appointment, Hastie served
on the bench until his death in 1976. He was considered an exemplary
jurist, earning high praise from his colleagues and the bar.49 From 1968
to 1971, when he assumed senior status, he served as the Circuit's Chief
Judge. In his time on the court, he was frequently mentioned as a candidate
for the United States Supreme Court.5 ° His death, on the eve of the nation's
bicentennial, was also a little over two decades after the Supreme Court
5
decided Brown, a decision for which he helped lay the groundwork.
CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that Hastie and other leading black civil rights lawyers
have been neglected by historians. 2 Their lives, by and large, remain
unchronicled and their achievements not widely recognized." Gradually,
however, their contributions to our nation are being given their due accord. 4 Gilbert Ware's biography of William Hastie is one such overdue
effort at recognition."
49. See, e.g., Memorial Service, 535 F.2d 5-21 (1976).
50. Hastie was first considered for the United States Supreme Court by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower. President John F. Kennedy gave him serious consideration in 1962 when Justice Charles
Whittaker retired. At that time, however, Kennedy considered it too politically dangerous to appoint
a black to the Court. President Lyndon Johnson considered Hastie, but decided instead to appoint
Thurgood Marshall. Ware neglects this aspect of Hastie's life, which surely must have led to
frustration and disappointment. A good account of it can be found, however, in Rusch, supra note
2, at 813-16.
51. It is a shame that, because of the present Administration's policies, the present efforts of civil
rights activists must be directed at the maintenance of this groundwork, instead of being able to
build further upon it. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (Administration
filed amicus brief in support of position that would allow a segregated college to retain tax-exempt
status); Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administrationand Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 309 (1984); see also, e.g., Editorial, Going Back to the Back of the Bus, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 10, 1985, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 26 (Reagan Administration has deliberately neglected
civil rights enforcement); N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1985, § 1, col. 2 (nat. ed.) (Reagan Administration's
policies perceived as anti-black and anti-minority).
52. These would include, to name a few, Justice Thurgood Marshall, Judge Spottswood Robinson,
and Judge Robert Carter.
53. See Smith, Forgotten Hero (Book Review), 98 HARV. L. REV. 482, 482 & n.5 (1984).
54. E.g., G. McNeil, supra note 16. For recent works in this area that also serve as an introduction
to the contributions of black lawyers to American history, see FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR
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Ware's well-researched book establishes Hastie as a leading figure in
the black fight for civil rights. It is a work, however, that is not without
some flaws. There are places where more legal analysis is needed and
there are times Ware is too uncritical of his subject. These are minor
criticisms, however, in light of what Ware has accomplished. William
Hastie is a notable contribution to black, and hence, American, history.

EQUAL JUSTICE (G. Ware & H. Hill eds. 1976); R. KLUGER, supra note 5; W. LEONARD, BLACK
LAWYERS (1977); G. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW (1983); G. SEGAL, IN ANY FIGHT, SOME FALL

(1975); Hastie, Toward an Equalitarian Legal Order 1930-50, 407 ANNALS 18 (1973).
55. As a result, Ware's William Hastie joins other recent biographies in acknowledging the
extraordinary accomplishments of notable blacks in the arts, sciences, and sports. E.g., W. BAKER,
JESSE
OWENS (1986) (track and field); G. BUCKLEY, THE HORNES (1986) (entertainment); J. COLLIER,
LOUIS ARMSTRONG: AN AMERICAN GENIUS (1984) (jazz); J. FRANKLIN, GEORGE WASHINGTON WILLIAMS
(1958) (history); K. MANNING, BLACK APOLLO OF SCIENCE: THE LIFE OF ERNEST EVERETT JUST (1983)

(biology); C. MEAD, CHAMPION: JOE LOUIS, BLACK HERO IN WHITE AMERICA (1985) (boxing); J.
TYGIEL, BASEBALL'S GREAT EXPERIMENT: JACKIE ROBINSON AND HIS LEGACY (1983) (baseball).

